For example, there are no articles in the Journal of World Investment and Trade, the Journal of International Economic Law or the Journal of World Trade in the last 3 years (2016-2018) that conduct empirical surveys on the impact of trade or investment commitments. Linda J Allen, “Reassessing the “Green” in NAFTA (2018) 52 JWT 557 contains detailed references to empirical work elsewhere on the impact of NAFTA, in order to support the arguments put forward in the article, but does not present detailed empirical research. There is evidence of a more nuanced image. There is no indication that any of the labour provisions that came into force have, in practice, led to disguised protectionism. At the same time, the work agenda in trade agreements is no longer just one thing promoted by industrialized countries. A quarter of all trade agreements on labour now exist between developing countries` trading partners (i.e. not between industrialized countries), including many countries in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.14 Does this mean that at least some developing countries have given up on opposing a trade commitment within the WTO and would sign such provisions without pressure from their developed colleagues? Or have the rules of work themselves changed so much that they are no longer feared? To better understand, it is necessary to examine the content of negotiated labour rules, what they wanted to achieve and the impact of these provisions on trading partners and the wider global economy. Only then will we be able to assess whether sound work arrangements have become a widely accepted element of trade agreements around the world. One of the main shortcomings is that the relevant civil servants, both in the EU and among their trading partners, do not have detailed knowledge of labour issues and/or do not consider them a priority issue.31 Therefore, the attention paid to the complexity and diversity of labour issues in the VARIOUS EU trading partners has not received sufficient attention.
32 At the same time, despite the formal counter-character of commitments in the labour chapters, labour issues within the EU are hardly taken into account.33 Studies also find that, under free trade agreements, MSCs are due to serious operational inadequacies, 34 The overall objective and role of MSCs is also unclear.35 As the central objective of the ethics of the TSD chapters, have not been implemented systematically.36 In the event of a conflict over the enforcement of obligations, the “flexible” dispute settlement provisions are not sufficient to resolve these situations. The absence of the threat of significant sanctions has a limited deterrent effect. Moreover, even in the case of overt infringements, the European Commission has been reluctant to invoke the dispute resolution option37. Finally, monitoring the “sustainable effects” of the agreements themselves, including how commitments under the agreements have had a positive and negative impact on workers` lives, has not been properly implemented38. The European Trade Union Confederation, “Trade and labour rights: toothless deals need teeth!” (December 17, 2018) consulted on July 19, 2019.